| | | |
| | | |
| 4.6. |
Economics of public pest management programs
|
| | 4.6.1. |
Public policy -- dealing with externalities |
| | | 4.6.1.1. |
Until now we have dealt only with
microeconomics at the farm level |
| | | |
- Pest control decisions based only on
factors internal to that system (usually
those affecting profits of the
enterprise)
- However, net private benefits and net
public benefits may be divergent
|
| | | 4.6.1.2. |
External costs |
| | | |
|
| | | 4.6.1.3. |
External benefits |
| | | |
|
| | 4.6.2. |
Cost and benefit analysis of public programs |
| | | 4.6.2.1. |
In broad outlines the same general
procedures (marginal analysis,
optimization, etc.) used for private
decisions can also be used for decision
making in the public sector -- with some
important differences |
|
Consider the following hypothetical example: Suppose we have a highly
hazardous pesticide for which we are
considering regulation. A study of the
risks gives:
Risk Analysis (Hypothetical Example) |
Deaths/year |
Probability |
Expected loss |
0 | 0.50 | 0 |
5 | 0.30 | 1.5 |
10 | 0.15 | 1.5 |
20 | 0.05 | 1.0 |
Average expected loss: | 4.0 |
Would you ban the pesticide?
Of course, to answer this question we cannot look only at the risks of the
pesticide; we must also consider its benefits. Suppose that in addition to
an outright ban on the pesticide we are also considering a 50% restriction
in the use of this pesticide, which reduces the average expected deaths
per year to 1.
Risk/Benefit Analysis (Hypothetical Example) |
|
Average expected benefit
(crop loss prevented) |
Average expected cost
(accidental deaths) |
No restriction | $10,000,000 |
4 |
50% restriction | $1,000,000 |
1 |
Outright ban | 0 |
0 |
With this information, would you restrict the pesticide or ban
it altogether?
|
| | | 4.6.2.2. |
We have to deal with the lack of commensurability
of the costs and benefits |
| | | |
- The actuarial approach is to reduce everything to commensurable
units -- a human life is worth its average expected total
income (about $250,000)
- The decision is not a technical one
but one of values
|
| | | 4.6.2.3. |
Cost/benefit analysis of public programs is
as much a political problem as it is an
economic one |
| | | |
- In microeconomics decisions are
usually based solely on their impacts
on one individual or the enterprise
- Cost/benefit analysis of public
programs requires a broad look at the
sectors of the economy affected
|
|
Hypothetical Summary of Net Benefits
of an Outright Ban of a Hypothetical Pesticide |
---|
|
Pesticide Manufacturer |
Pesticide Dealer |
Grower |
Farm Laborers |
Food Processor |
Consumer |
General Public |
|
Totals |
Revenue from pesticide |
-10,000,000 |
-5,000,000 |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
|
-15,000,000 |
Revenue from crop |
. |
. |
-10,000,000 |
-1,000,000 |
-5,000,000 |
. |
. |
|
-16,000,000 |
Food Prices |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
-1,000,000 |
. |
|
-1,000,000 |
... |
... |
... |
... |
... |
... |
... |
... |
|
... |
Toxicity to user |
. |
+1,000,000 |
+1,000,000 |
+8,000,000 |
. |
. |
. |
|
+10,000,000 |
Toxicity to consumer |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
+100,000 |
. |
|
+100,000 |
Environmental pollution |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
+500,000 |
|
+500,000 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals |
-10,000,000 |
-4,000,000 |
-9,000,000 |
+7,000,000 |
-5,000,000 |
-900,000 |
+500,000 |
|
-21,400,000 |
|
| | 4.6.3. |
The "fallacy of composition" -- what's good for the
group is good for the individual |
| | | 4.6.3.1. |
Functional relationship of price and
quantity |
| | | |
- Demand: buyers competing in the market
place are willing to pay a higher price
for a product as the available quantity
decreases
- Supply: suppliers competing in the
market place are willing to enter the
market and produce more as the price
increases
- Total revenue -- the product of quantity
and price
|
|
|
| | | 4.6.3.2. |
Any technological advance (such as a new
pest management technique) that increases
yield or decreases production costs reduces
the slope of the supply curve |
|
|
| | | |
- The equilibrium price and the total revenue are
reduced
- The benefactors (among the growers) of
new technological advances are the early
innovators who can make larger profits
before the supply adjusts to the new
equilibrium
- Consumers benefit from the lower
equilibrium price
|