Cornell University


PHI 361: First Paper Topics
Fall 2001

First Paper, due Monday, October 8th

Write a 2-3 page paper, answering one of the following three questions:

  1. According to Putnam, 'I do not exist' is a self-refuting statment; and "the supposition that we are brains in a vat" also has the property of being self-refuting.
    1. Explain what Putnam means by "self-refuting" (in the first and the second sense).
    2. Explain why one would think that 'I do not exist' is self-refuting (be sure to say which of the two senses of being self-refuting is being attributed to this statment).
    3. Explain why Putnam thinks the BIV supposition is self-refuting (again, be explicit about which of the two senses of being self-refuting is being attributed to the BIV supposition).

  2. Do Moore and Putnam disagree about whether the existence of external things (in Moore's sense) follows from the truth of such statments as "Here is a hand" (uttered with appropriate "accompanying gestures")? Elaborate, clarify, and defend your answer.

  3. On p.18 of Meditation II Descartes, having just ascertained that he exists, wonders what kind of thing it is whose existence he has just ascertained. He wants to know what kind of attributes he can attribute to this thing (himself). Regarding the question of whether he can attribute sense-perception to this thing, he writes:
    But what shall I now say that I am ... ? But what about the attributes I assigned to the soul? ... Sense-perception? This surely does not occur without a body, and besides, when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the sense at all.
    But then on p.19 of Meditation II Descartes, having by now ascertained that he is a thinking thing, wonders what sort of thing a thinking thing is -- what are the specific activities (as we might put it) that fall under the general heading of thinking>? In the course of this discussion, regarding the question of sense-perception, Descartes writes:
    ... Lastly, it is also the same 'I' who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.
    How can we understand the quoted passages as being compatible with each other?

Please be as concise and clear as possible. Always provide specific page references and bibliographic information for work you discuss. (When you attribute a view to an author, you must cite the work and page number of the passage on which your attribution is based. All quotes must be provided with page references.)


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