But what shall I now say that I am ... ? But what about the attributes I assigned to the soul? ... Sense-perception? This surely does not occur without a body, and besides, when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the sense at all.But then on p.19 of Meditation II Descartes, having by now ascertained that he is a thinking thing, wonders what sort of thing a thinking thing is -- what are the specific activities (as we might put it) that fall under the general heading of thinking>? In the course of this discussion, regarding the question of sense-perception, Descartes writes:
... Lastly, it is also the same 'I' who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.How can we understand the quoted passages as being compatible with each other?
Please be as concise and clear as possible. Always provide specific page references and bibliographic information for work you discuss. (When you attribute a view to an author, you must cite the work and page number of the passage on which your attribution is based. All quotes must be provided with page references.)
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