Cornell University


PHI 332: Fourth Paper
Spring 2003

Fourth Paper, due Friday, May 2nd


Choose a Topic:

  1. Kaplan defines the notion: name a represents object x to speaker s on page 385 (in Martinich) of his paper "Quantifying In".

    Could Kripke's puzzle about Pierre arise if the names 'London' and 'Londre' each "represented" (in Kaplan's sense) the city London to Pierre? In other words, do both of these names represent the city London to Pierre as Kripke describes him; and if not, could we fill in further details of the story, while preserving those aspects which lead to the puzzle, in such a way that those names would each represent the city to Pierre?

    What bearing does your answer have on Kaplan's analysis of "relational" belief (as formally represented, for example, by his sentence (44))?

  2. Explain as clearly as possible and in your own words why Perry thinks that appeal to relativized propositions will not solve the problem of the essential indexical. (Be sure to say here what the problem of the essential indexical is, and what would count as "solving" it. (Who or what is the problem a problem for?))

    Do you agree with his reasons? If so, why? If not, why not? Do you think that relativized propositions might help in some cases but not others?

    You may wish to (but don't at all have to) consult Perry's (1977) article "Frege on Demonstratives" in the journal Philosophical Review volume 86 (1977). You can find this paper online if you connect through a Cornell web server. (Ithaca College may also subscribe to this service, called "JSTOR" (at www.jstor.org), but I'm not sure.)


Always provide specific page references for passages you discuss.


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