SIAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE

I. THE PROBLEMS OF SIAM


Introduction

The following set of three memoranda resulted from the visit to Siam in the summer of 1926 of Francis B. Sayre. Sayre had been one of a series of professors of Harvard Law School to serve as Adviser in Foreign Affairs to the government of Siam. He had been appointed in 1924, originally for a period of one year, and then had spent another year in the service of Siam in Europe, negotiating new treaties between Siam and the Western powers which stipulated the gradual abolition of the various special rights and privileges which the West had enjoyed in Siam since the mid-nineteenth century.[1] Treaty revision and the elimination of extraterritoriality and other judicial, political, and economic restrictions on Thai autonomy had long been one of the most cherished goals of the Thai government, and Sayre's success in this difficult undertaking gave him immense prestige in Siam. At the time of his visit to Bangkok in 1926, the British Minister reported unhappily of "the singular influence over the Siamese Government acquired by Dr. Francis B. Sayre," whom he conceded had done much good for Siam, and, he thought, some harm as well.[2] Among other honors, Sayre received from the government of Siam the Thai title of nobility 'Phya Kalyan Maitri'[3] and it is with this title that he signed his memorandum, and that Prince Damrong refers to him; King Prajadhipok, however, uses 'Dr. Sayre.'

Sayre continued to hold his "singular influence" long after he left Thai service. In the late 1930's he was appointed Governor-General of the Philippines, and an American intelligence report prepared during the Second World War noted that, "Francis B. Sayre's work as adviser to the Thai government on foreign affairs is well known in Thailand and is so highly regarded that before the war Thai diplomats crossing the Pacific were always instructed to stop in the Philippines and pay their respects to him."[4]

Sayre returned to Bangkok in the summer of 1926 at the request of King Prajadhipok, who had succeeded his elder brother Vajiravudh only few months earlier. In his autobiography Sayre has briefly described this visit as follows:[5]

I could not forget Siam. Often in my mind I was still living in the Far East. In November, 1925, King Rama VI, whom I had known and worked with, died. He was succeeded by his half-brother Prajadhipok; and King Prajadhipok expressed the strong desire to have me come back to Siam. Although I could not give up my work at Harvard, I visited Bangkok during the 1926 summer holidays at his request to confer with him and advise him as to some of the pressing demands for constitutional reforms.

The deep-rooted and far-reaching conflict between East and West was beginning to beset Siam. Students returning from England or France or America often were unhappy and disturbed, with half-baked ideas about democracy and human liberty; they wanted Siam to adopt Western forms almost overnight, as if these were but outward garments. Many felt that Siamese culture was outdated, and their minds seethed with modern, Western ideas, often superficial and misunderstood. One of their outspoken demands was for a Parliament and a modern Constitution.

Discussing these issues with His Majesty, I had to point out the inherent dangers. In Siam there was no middle class. The Siamese peasants took little or no interest in public affairs but lived their simple lives in secluded rural districts. To set up a legislature and clothe it with real power overnight without an educated electorate to control it would be likely, I suggested, to invite trouble and possible corruption. Power uncontrolled was almost bound to breed corruption.

Other important issues upon which the King sought advice were how best to choose a successor to the throne, what changes if any should be made in the framework of government, whether or not to appoint a Premier. As I talked with him I felt the utter sincerity of the new monarch and his real desire to lead Siam into modern nationhood.

King Prajadhipok's seeking of advice from Sayre is characteristic. The young king frequently referred to his lack of experience in government and his fears that he would be unequal to the responsibilities of absolute monarchy, while Sayre was a trusted adviser from the previous reign who had successfully advocated Siam's cause in the difficult field of international diplomacy, and who while having firsthand experience in Siam was still an 'outsider' who could be expected to put the interests of the country ahead of the interests of any special group.

King Prajadhipok's letter to Sayre indicates that Sayre and the king first met to discuss the king's memorandum, and that Sayre subsequently submitted his opinions in writing. The king then sent copies of both his own and Sayre's memoranda to Prince Damrong, whose draft replies are dated five days after the date of Sayre's memorandum. Whether the king asked for opinions on his exchange of views with Sayre from other advisers is uncertain. It is possible that he did--documents on important matters were often circulated to all the members of the Supreme Council of State for comment--but in the papers of Prince Damrong, from which copies of the three memoranda have been taken, there is no conclusive evidence one way or another.[6]

Of the three memoranda, that of King Prajadhipok, entitled "Problems of Siam" is of the greatest interest to the historian. It sets forth, in the form of nine questions, what the king saw as the most important problems facing the country at the beginning of the Seventh Reign, together with some historical background and explanations. The first two questions concern the problem of royal succession and how best to insure that a competent king would always occupy the throne. (The king returned frequently to this question--see the similar remarks in II.) The third and fourth questions concern whether or not some form of representative government would be desirable in Siam and the fifth through seventh questions concern the role of the Supreme Council of State and the possibility of having a prime minister and a legislative council. The last two questions, which are treated only briefly, are on financial affairs and how to encourage the assimilation of the large Chinese minority in Siam.

The discussion by the king himself on kingship and the royal family in Siam is of considerable interest, as is the information on the reasons behind the establishment of the Supreme Council of State. There are some deliberately oblique but still explicit references to the financial and administrative problems of the last years of the Sixth Reign, including frank discussion of the favoritism and corruption that were thought to characterize the court clique, and the consequent decline in the prestige of the monarchy. Sayre also makes discrete reference to the failings of the Sixth Reign, while Prince Damrong, who did not have cordial relations with King Vajiravudh, speaks bluntly of Prajadhipok's "deplorable inheritance"--"... the authority of the sovereign had fallen much in respect and confidence, the treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the government was corrupted and the services more or less in confusion."

In view of the later history of the reign, there is special significance in King Prajadhipok's admission, "I will not say much about financial affairs as I do feel that I am not competent in the matter."

Sayre, in his lengthy memorandum, replies to each of the king's questions except the final one concerning the Chinese, on which subject he says he will need time for more study before being able to express an opinion. The greater part of his argument concerns a proposal for determining the succession through the selection of a provisional heir by the king with the advice and consent of the Privy Council at fixed intervals, and an exposition of the advantages which he believes would result from the introduction of a prime minister system of government. He includes an outline preliminary draft of a constitution embodying the political institutions he proposes.

Prince Damrong says at the outset that he will discuss only those issues raised by Sayre which have immediate implications, and most of his memorandum is devoted to arguing against Sayre's proposal for the appointment of a prime minister responsible for the day-to-day administration of the government. While a number of objections are marshaled, the one that always seems to be uppermost in Prince Damrong's mind is that the appointment of a prime minister would inevitably diminish the prestige and authority of the monarchy.

All three memoranda have been taken from the copies in Prince Damrong's files.[7] A few obvious errors in spelling and grammar have been corrected.


A. KING PRAJADHIPOK'S MEMORANDUM


Sukhodaya Palace
July 23rd 1926

Dear Dr. Sayre,

I am sending you with this letter a Memorandum on some of the Problems of Siam with a Questionnaire for your consideration. I am afraid I have written it in rather a hurry so that I could send it to you before our conversation to-morrow. We will have a preliminary talk to-morrow when we can discuss those questions more fully. I should like to have your answer in writing when you have considered them fully.

This Memorandum by no means exhausts all the problems of the country. I have only treated of those that I think important. If you have any other opinions beside the question touched upon, they will be very welcome.

I hope that they are making you comfortable at the Phya Thai Hotel.

Yours sincerely,

(M.R.) Prajadhipok R.

PROBLEMS OF SIAM

The Constitution

a) The position of the King.

The Kings of Siam are supposed to be elected by the people. In former days a Ceremony of election was performed. At the death of the King, a Council consisting of Royal Princes, Ministers of State and High Dignitaries of the Church was held. The Senior Prince or Minister then proposes that such and such a Prince should be elevated to the Throne and asks if anybody has any objection. There is generally no answer to this question, but sometimes an answer in the affirmative is given by saluting with the hands or an inclination of the head. The King is then formally proclaimed, and the words "elected by the people" are added to his titles.

This custom was continued to the Fifth Reign. King Chulalongkorn then made an innovation by creating a Crown Prince,[8] who succeeded to the Throne without question, the formality at the death of the King being a sort of proclamation only.

King Rama 6th, not having any son, it was resided [decided] in a Cabinet Council that he should be succeeded by his full brothers. Later he made a law of succession.

This Law of Succession contains 2 distinct principles i.e. the Principle of election and the Principle of Hereditary succession. In this law it starts by saying that the King reserves the absolute right of appointing any member of the Royal Family as his Successor. But should the King die without having appointed a Successor, the Succession will go to his sons. This sounds straight-forward enough, but a complication arises here owing to the habit of polygamy. The Law specifies that the sons of Somdetch Phra Rajini should have the precedence over the others. Then the preference goes to the sons of the mother next in rank to the Queen (there are 4 different ranks) and descending the scale finally to the sons of concubines. Again this sounds all right in principle, if it were not for the fact that a concubine may be raised in rank at any time, AND the Queen herself may have her rank lowered according to the whims of the King. This, to my mind, creates very great possibilities of complications. I would suggest that priority of the sons be regulated by the birth ranks of the mothers. I mean priority be given to the sons born of a Princess, such as daughters of a King, then nieces of a King and so on. If there are more than one son of mothers of the same rank, the succession would then go by the seniority in age of those Princes. When there are no sons the succession would go to the King's brothers. According to the Law as it is, the priority is still regulated by the created rank of the mothers. I would suggest the same modification as above. The next question is that the Law does not make it quite clear, when there being no brothers left or when the one who should have succeeded has died, whether all the sons of that Prince would be eligible to the Throne or whether it is only the sons of the Principal wife only who could succeed. The case has really occurred which shows that in the late King's mind ALL the sons could succeed. In my case the son of the Prince of Petchabun[9] was passed over by the expressed wishes of the late King. Now, many people find that the idea that ALL the sons could succeed was objectionable owing to the fact that some Princes have the most disreputable minor wives who are really not fitted to be the mothers of kings. They also say that the Siamese follow the Indian custom and want their Kings to be born of a Princess of the Royal Family. Such Princes are known as "being born in a pure womb." They are the Chow Fa's.

The questions of principles involved, of which I would like to ask your opinions are:

1st Question Should the King have the right to choose any Prince as his Heir? If the King has this right, ought not this right to be extended to a Council of High Princes and Ministers of State, in the case when the King dies without having chosen an Heir. At present the King alone has the right to nominate an Heir. It would be perhaps more logical to allow a Council of some sort to exercise that right when the King has not done so. This would be more consistent with the idea of an Elected King.

2nd Question Should the principle of choice be admitted at all or ought the succession to be by birth alone, and ought there to be some amendments to the present law or not?

b) The Powers of the King

As you well know, the King has absolute power in every thing. This principle is very good and very suitable for the country, as long as we have a good King. If the King is really an Elected King, it is probable that he would be a fairly good King. But this idea of election is really a very theoretical one, and in reality the King[s] of Siam are really hereditary, with a very limited possibility of choice. Such being the case, it is not at all certain that we shall always have a good King. Then the absolute power may become a positive danger to the country. Besides this, things have very much changed. In olden days the actions of the King were hardly ever questioned. It would not have been safe to do so. The King was really respected and his words were really laws. But things began to change with the new order of things. In the days of King Chulalongkorn, the King was still very much feared and respected. Even then towards to [sic] the end of the Reign, there was a young party who began to criticize the King in many ways, but not openly. In the Reign which has just ended, things got much worse, for many reasons which I have no need to tell you, as you know them well enough. The King has become a person liable to be influenced by anybody who could gain the ears of a favourite. Every official is more or less suspected of embezzlement or nepotism. Fortunately the Princes were still respected as being on the whole honest folks. What was very regrettable was that the Court was heartily detested and in the later years was on the verge of being ridiculed. The birth of FREE PRESS aggravated matters still more. The position of the King has become one of great difficulty. The movements of opinion in this country give a sure sign that the days of Autocratic Rulership are numbered. The position of the King must be made more secure if this Dynasty is going to last. Some sort of GUARANTEE must be found against an unwise King.

What form should the Government of Siam take?

3rd Question Must this country have a Parliamentary system one day, and is really the Anglo-Saxon type of Parliamentary Government suitable to an Eastern People?

4th Question Is this country ready to have some sort of representative Government?

I personally have my doubts as to the 3rd question. As to the 4th question, my personal opinion is an emphatic NO.

What then should be done in the meanwhile? My first attempt to find some sort of guarantee for the person of the King is the creation of the Supreme Council.

c) The Supreme Council

The Genesis of the Supreme Council is worth telling with some detail. I have discussed the idea of such a Council among my friends for some time, before I had any idea that I would have the opportunity of creating it myself.

The idea found a firm supporter in Prince Damrong. Just one day before the late King's death, I consulted the Princes Bhanurangsi and Paribatra about this idea.[10] The former was not very keen on it, as he thought it would lessen the prestige of the King, but the latter was enthusiastic. When the King died, it was decided that the Supreme Council should be created at once. We had 2 days only to prepare a proclamation, and 3 days after the death of the late King, the Supreme Council was proclaimed by the means of a speech to the Privy Councillors.

I will now explain the reasons for creating this Council in such a hurry. As you know, the late King was beginning to lose the confidence of the people towards the end of the Reign and the question of Succession caused great anxieties. The only High Prince with any reputation was Prince Paribatra and many people would have liked the succession to go to him, while it was well known that the King was expecting to have a child, and should he not have a boy the succession would go to his brothers whom, I am sorry to say, the majority of people did not think much of. For myself, I was a dark horse and in any case inexperienced in affairs of state. Very fortunately for me, on the death of my brother Asdang, I had several occasions to act for the King during his absence from the Capital and during his illness. I was fortunate enough to have been able to gain the confidence of the Ministers and High Princes, so that my candidature to the Throne had the approval of those persons. I also had the best support from Prince Paribatra.[11]

On my succession to the Throne it was thought absolutely necessary to do something at once to gain the confidence of the people, hence the creation of the Supreme Council. This had its immediate effect and I really gained the confidence of the people in one day. The reason why this action had such an immediate result was that it promised many desirable things.

Firstly, that the Royal Family is getting together and will work in harmony.

Secondly, that the King was willing to seek the advice of highly respected Princes who have had experience of State affairs and who have the confidence of the people, none of the HATED official class being included in this Council.

Thirdly, that the King's power to take arbitrary actions would be lessened by this Council (remember that in the present state of opinions in the country, the King is thought to be more liable to do more harm than good).

Therefore the immediate result of the creation of the Supreme Council had been very good, and I think that it has served its purpose very well and that my action was well justified. Since then, people have had time to reflect a little and the Supreme Council has come to be criticized a great deal. I will enumerate some of the criticisms and questioning about it.

1. People ask whether the Supreme Council is an advisory body or an executive body. Some think that the Council has too much power. I would answer that the Council is entirely advisory since it cannot carry out any executive actions at all. Its opinions have executive effect through the King alone. The way that the Council works at present is that it meets in the presence of the King and NEVER meets without the presence of the King except by special order. Questions submitted to the Council are: all questions of policy, questions of national finance, appointments of high officials such as Ministers of State, questions of high and special rewards such as ranks of Chow Phya and Grand Crosses (there has been abuse and backstairs influence in the past) and questions concerning tradition and important ceremonials. The King may also seek advice in personal or Royal Family affairs.

In any question that concerns any Ministry, the Minister responsible may be invited to attend the meeting.

The Supreme Councillors sit in the Cabinet Council and give their opinions. Final decision on important matters such as the promulgation of a New Law or the signing of a Treaty is always given in the Cabinet Council. Both in the Cabinet Council and in the Supreme Council the decision of the King alone prevails, although in the ordinary course of events, the King always adopts the opinion of the majority, but being still absolute he need not necessarily do so.

2. It is criticized that the Supreme Council being an advisory body should not sit in the Cabinet Council which is an executive body. I admit that this is quite true. This system is only adopted for the sake of convenience. It would make business much slower if the Supreme Council were not to sit in the Cabinet as any question decided on in the Cabinet will have to be deliberated on again in the Supreme Council. And since the King alone decides all questions, it does not seem necessary to introduce any complications at the present stage. If there is a Prime Minister to preside [over] the Cabinet Council and who will submit the decisions of the Cabinet to the King, then it would be well to have the Supreme Council as a separate body which the King could consult and then give his final decision. We will talk more of this later.

3. That there should be some law to indicate and regulate the duties of the Supreme Councillors. This is certainly needed, and a draft law has been drawn up, but owing to the conflicting opinions as to WHAT SHOULD BE THE DUTIES of the Supreme Councillors, I have shelved that draft for the present until a clearer idea of what is the best form to give to such a Council is forthcoming.

4. That the Supreme Council is approved of at this moment owing to the personalities of the Councillors, and that in the case when these Councillors are replaced by others, the Council would not have the con fidence of the people. I think such ideas are rather pessimistic. If there are no more good men in the future, we can have no hope for Siam.

5. That the existence of the Supreme Council lessens the prestige of the King. I admit that this is true, but I consider that the prestige of Kingship in this country can hardly be lower than at this moment. I have already explained the causes I doubt very much whether the old prestige could ever be regained. I think that the evolution of the public opinion in Bangkok and [the] educated class has already gone too far, and that it would be a wild goose chase to try and get back any of the old glory. The King should be content to do all the good he can, even though the credit were given to somebody else. I believe that at the present time and with the sentiment of the people as it is at this moment, all credit will always go to somebody else to some Minister or some Prince, if there is no Supreme Council. If any thing goes wrong, it would be attributed to influence of some wicked person and the fool ishness of the King in being influenced by that person. People seem to have the idea that the King is a sort [of] nonentity who is easily in fluenced by anybody, and that he has no opinion of his own whatever. This statement may sound exaggerated, but it is really very near to the truth.

6. That the Power of the King is lessened. This is, of course, what is intended. As I have already said, the days of absolute power are numbered. The S.C. [Supreme Council] certainly lessens the King's power to do harm by the arbitrary actions, but surely, it does not lessen his power to do good as he ought to be supported very whole heartedly by the S.C. in that case.

I believe that some of the reasons why the S.C. is so much criticized and feared now is some sort of sentiment of envy. Anybody who has the ears of the King is always hated. It also makes backstairs influence rather difficult, because the people will now have to go to 5 or more backstairs instead of one or two.

Having stated some [of] the criticisms against the present form of the Supreme Council, I would put the

5th Question What is the best form to give to the Supreme Council? Is it worthwhile to make it a permanent institution of the country, or should it be allowed to die a natural death?

d) The Cabinet.

You have said in your article in the Atlantic Monthly that the Governmental system of Siam is in water-tight compartments.[12] This is perfectly true, but I think that it is inherent to the system of having Ministers each responsible to the King alone. Each works for the benefit of his Ministry alone and not to the benefit of the whole. An attempt has been made to improve matters by having weekly meeting[s]. At least the Ministers meet once a week to discuss matters together, and I think that there has been a real improvement. But it would be better still if we were to have a Prime Minister to preside over the Cabinet. He should be allowed a fairly free choice of his colleagues, so that the Cabinet will work well as an homogeneous body. The Ministers will be nominated by the King after having conferred with the Premier. I believe that this would be a real gain to the country. The Supreme Council will then act as a controlling body. I have already indicated the line in which work would be done under this system. The thing to decide is, whether this system should be used now or later.

6th Question Should we have a Prime Minister? Should this system be inaugurated now?

e) The Legislative Council.

The question of having some sort of Legislative Council has been discussed many times. A sort of Legislative Council was created early in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn. This Council consisted of Ministers of State and 12 nominated members. The Council remained in existence for about 5 years and since then has become a dead letter although some of the Councillors of those days are still living. I think that it was given up because it was felt that there was no real need for such a Council and that it only delayed the work of the Ministers.

When the late King came to the Throne, the Prince of Pitsanuloke[13] recommended the formation of a Council of State similar to what existed in Russia at that time (not the Douma). I believe the matter was discussed in a Cabinet meeting, but the scheme was not adopted, owing to the opinion of Mr. Jens Westengaard who thought that any makeshift form of Parliamentary system would serve no good purpose.[14]

Prince Damrong has now submitted a new idea of a Legislative Council, composed of officials nominated from every Ministry. This Council will really work as a sort of Law drafting Commission. We have already got a Department for drafting laws, and I am not sure that the proposed Council would be able to do the work better. Rather the contrary I am afraid, and it will delay work too. Besides that, it may attempt to criticize the policy of the Ministers, and as the Councillors are officials in the Ministries appointed for a time only, the system may not be very good for discipline. The difficulty about such a nominated Council has always been the question of recruiting the members. At the present moment we cannot afford to pay the members, and we cannot get unpaid members.

7th Question Should we have a Legislative Council? What should be the constitution of such a Council. (I have received many petitions to form some sort of Council).

2. Financial Affairs

I will not say much about financial affairs as I do feel that I am not competent in the matter. I think that we have a very capable advisor in Sir Edward Cook.[15]

The one important question is the proper division of the resources available among the Ministries. I know that, in your opinion, we spend too much on the Defence forces. I am inclined to agree with you in this respect, yet the cutting down of expenditure on Defence is a very serious responsibility. Very few people dare advocate such a thing, as we have too many experiences of the swashbuckling policy of our neighbors.

I am getting the whole of our financial policy overhauled, but I am somewhat at a disadvantage in not [being] really competent in the matter.

8th Question Have you any opinion as to our financial policy?

3. Internal Affairs

The one change of importance that I am contemplating at this moment, is the organization of Municipal Councils. I think that, at first, these Councils should be nominated. Later on we might try Municipal elections. This would give some idea as to the possibility of inaugurating some form of representative government. It will satisfy the advanced opinions of the country, and will be a good demonstration as to whether the people are really ready to have an effective voice in the affairs of the country.

Another question which I consider important is the Chinese question. The Chinese are very useful in Siam. In former days they marry [married] Siamese women and became very good Siamese citizens. But since the Chinese revolution, there has been quite a change. Now the Chinese bring their wives from China, and are determined to remain Chinese. They organize schools in which they teach practically only the Chinese language. There is a rather disturbing state of affairs, as we lose a source of good and laborious citizens, and with the new ideas in China filtering through, it becomes a latent danger.[16]

9th Question Can something be done to make the Chinese become Siamese as in the old days? (In the Straits Settlements they are willing to become British subjects.)

These are all the problems which we have not yet found satisfactory solutions or which are doubtful as to the proper way to attack. Others are being solved or on the point of being solved.


[1]Sayre's own account of the problems encountered in revising Siam's treaties with the West, and how they were overcome, is given in his autobiography Glad Adventure (New York, 1957; Thai translation, Bangkok, 1972), Chapters 7 and 8, and in the two articles cited in note 5 of the notes on the three memoranda. The first Western government leader to agree to give up his country's special privileges in Siam had been Woodrow Wilson, who was Sayre's father-in-law.

[2]Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 3572/78/40 (July 29, 1926), Waterlow to Chamberlain. British diplomats generally took a dim view of American advisers and missionaries in Siam, whom they regarded as well-meaning but misguided meddlers. Waterlow wrote that "The Siamese adore Americans," including some "who one would think had nothing in particular to recommend them." This he attributed to the United States being "a perpetual fountain of gifts"--schools, money, 'uplift,' etc., and also to the American character with its hail-fellow-well-met bonhomie. As Waterlow saw the American, "His stock of moral platitudes is successful for the same reason that Ford cars are successful; it is standardized and it is the same for all men regardless of colour and size."

Earlier another British Minister in Bangkok had complained of Sayre and his predecessors being "idealistically-minded theorists without any practical experience of Siamese administration outside Bangkok, and always ready, whether from interest or conviction, to take the Siamese at their own valuation . . . ," to which a hand in the Foreign Office in London appended a note on "the harm done by well-meaning American advice,--that great menace to civilization." (Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 1687/183/40, April 9, 1925, Greg to Chamberlain.)

[3]''Phya' was the second highest rank of awarded nobility and, except in a very few cases, the highest ever given to Westerners. 'Kalyan' means 'beautiful' or 'excellent' and 'Maitri' 'friendship,' a reference to Sayre's success in the conduct of Siam's foreign relations.

[4]United States, Office of Strategic Services, "Social Conditions, Attitudes and Propaganda in Thailand with Suggestions for American Orientation Toward the Thai" (Washington, June 19, 1942), p. 13.

[5]Glad Adventure, p. 129. Prajadhipok was a full brother of Rama VI, not a half brother. Minor errors like this are frequent in Sayre's accounts of Siam. (The drafts of Glad Adventure, in the Sayre Papers in the Library of Congress, show that Sayre originally had it right, but then 'corrected' the text. The file on "Siam" in the Sayre Papers contains correspondence from the 1920's to the 1950's, including several letters exchanged with King Prajadhipok and with the present King.)

[6]There is a letter (in Thai) dated October 8, 1926, from Chao Phya Mahithon, the head of the Royal Secretariat, to Prince Damrong saying that the king has ordered that all of the "various" papers relating to his memorandum be collected together, and that from a letter of August 1 it appears that Prince Damrong submitted a memorandum on the subject which cannot now be found, presumably because it was sent to Sayre and not returned. Chao Phya Mahithon therefore requests that Prince Damrong send a copy of his memorandum to the Royal Secretariat. (National Archives, Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/32.)

[7]National Archives, Papers of Prince Damrong, 47/32.

[8]The first Crown Prince was Vajirunhis, the elder brother of Prince Mahidol, who died in 1895 before coming to the throne. His half-brother Vajiravudh was then elevated to the rank of Crown Prince, and succeeded to the throne in 1910.

[9]The Prince of Petchabun was Chutadhuj, the fourth of the five brothers, who had died in 1923 leaving a son, Prince Varanand. After the death of the third brother, Prince Asdang, early in 1925, it appeared that according to the 1924 Law of Succession Prince Varanand, who was only three years old, would be the legal heir to the throne, despite the fact that his mother was not royal. However, the law applied only if the late king failed to designate a successor, and when Vajiravudh died without male issue he passed over Prince Varanand and, as expected, named his last remaining full brother, Prajadhipok, as his heir

[10]Prince Bhanurangsi was a younger full brother of King Chulalongkorn, and the senior prince of the royal family during the period. He was regarded as a conservative in most matters, and a staunch defender of royal prerogative. Prince Bhanurangsi died in June of 1928. Prince Boriphat (Paribatra) was a chao fa son of King Chulalongkorn, and a powerful figure in the Seventh Reign, serving successively as Minister of War and Minister of the Interior. Immediately after the 1932 coup he was sent into exile, and he died in Java in 1944.

The other two original members of the Supreme Council of State, in addition to Prince Bhanurangsi, Prince Boriphat, and Prince Damrong, were Prince Naris, a chao fa son of King Mongkut, and Prince Kitayakorn (the Prince of Chantaburi), a son of King Chulalongkorn. Of these, Prince Boriphat, Prince Damrong, and Prince Naris continued to serve on the Supreme Council until the 1932 coup.

[11]Prince Boriphat (Paribatra) was older than Prajadhipok, and more experienced in government. His mother was also a queen, and as Prajadhipok himself says, many people would have preferred that Boriphat succeed. Boriphat however loyally supported his younger half-brother as the legitimate successor designated by the late king, and he even turned down an offer by Prajadhipok to step aside in his favor. There is an account of this episode by Pridi, who says that his source of information was members of the royal family and high officials, in Pramot Phungsunthòn, editor, Bang Ruang kieokap Phraboromawongsanuwong nai rawang Songkhram Lok Khrang Thi 2 (Some Accounts Concerning the Royal Family During the Second World War), Bangkok, 1972, pp. 92-94. See also the accounts in Wichai Prasangsit, Phaendin Somdet Phra Pokklao (The Reign of King Prajathipok), Bangkok, 1962, pp. 87-89; and Prince Dhani, Chumnum Niphon, pp. 8-9.

Prince Boriphat has usually been depicted in post-1932 writings as a reactionary and sinister power behind the throne in the Seventh Reign. The evidence from the period, however, suggests that he was both less conservative and less powerful than has been generally supposed. The British Minister in Bangkok, in a despatch dated December 18, 1925, reported on a conversation with Prince Boriphat as follows (Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 260/78/40):

His Royal Highness finally touched on constitutional reform and said that it had been decided to inaugurate a sort of legislative assembly composed probably of Privy Councilors. It was necessary to go very slow to begin with, with a moderate and restricted programme which could be extended gradually so as to meet the new spirit which would be created by compulsory education. The Prince said he was determined not to be caught napping and to be in advance of, and not behind, public opinion. In 1927 a new British Minister said of Boriphat, "He is anxious that Siam should not merely keep abreast but should actually be ahead of the times and is in favour of a more democratic form of government as soon as the people are fitted for it. In this he is more likely to go too fast than too slowly." Great Britain, Foreign Office Records, F 1903/1903/40 (January 28, 1927). Similarly, the Thai archives of the period at times picture Boriphat as a 'liberal' relative to some of the other influential princes, and occasionally show him being overruled by the king or a 'conservative' faction.

[12]The article referred to is Francis Bowes Sayre, "Siam," Atlantic Monthly, June 1926, pp. 841-851; the particular passage cited is on page 844. This article deals primarily with the government administration, and particularly the legal system, describing conditions as Sayre found them in the last years of the Sixth Reign. After his return to Siam in the summer of 1926 Sayre wrote another, better-known article, "Siam's Fight for Sovereignty" (Atlantic Monthly, November 1927, pp. 674-689). In the final two pages of this article Sayre discussed the death of Rama VI and wrote approvingly of the economic and political changes instituted by Prajadhipok, concluding with the verdict that "Siam's star is rising." In an oblique but unmistakable reference to his talks with Prajadhipok in the summer of 1926, and particularly to the set of documents published here, Sayre said (p. 689):

Troublous constitutional problems still remain. His Majesty keenly appreciates the difficulties and dangers of absolute monarchy; he has a sincere desire to democratize the government and to shift part of its responsibilities to the shoulders of the people. But a Parliament uncontrolled by an intelligent and interested electorate is a far more dangerous engine of tyranny than an absolute monarch; and, until the groundwork can be built by pushing forward the work of general education, the parliamentary form of government must wait. Programmes, nevertheless, can be formulated looking toward this goal; and in the meantime the King is hoping to develop the people's political experience by creating popularly elected municipal councils in some of the larger cities.

(There are comments on drafts of this article by King Prajadhipok and other high officials in the National Archives, Seventh Reign, Royal Secretariat, 19.1/4.)

[13]The late king was of course Vajiravudh, who came to the throne in 1910. The Prince of Pitsanuloke was Prince Chakrabongse, the eldest of Vajiravudh's four younger full brothers. Until his death in 1920 Prince Chakrabongse was regarded as the likely heir to the throne if Vajiravudh remained without male children, although under the Law of Succession promulgated after his death he would have been disqualified because of his marriage (which ended in divorce) to a Russian lady. Prince Chakrabongse had been educated in Imperial Russia, and after his return to Siam followed a military career, distinguishing himself as an able and energetic administrator.

[14]Jens I. Westengard (1871-1918), a professor in the Harvard Law School, had gone to Siam in 1903 as Assistant General Adviser to the government of Siam. In 1908, on the death of his predecessor, he became General Adviser. Upon his retirement in 1915 the title 'General Adviser' was discontinued and replaced by 'Adviser in Foreign Affairs.'

[15]Sir Edward Cook (1881-1955) served as Financial Adviser from 1925 to 1930, one in a long series of British officials to fill this post.

[16]The various factors cited resulted in a perceived decline in the rate of assimilation of Chinese into Thai society in the 1920's, which coupled with a sharp rise in the numbers of Chinese emigrating to Siam in the early years of the Seventh Reign made the 'Chinese question' a major concern of Prajadhipok and his advisers, one consequence of which was the imposition of the first effective measures to limit Chinese immigration. Such a step had been considered before, particularly when Vajiravudh was writing of the dangers of a Chinese 'nation within a nation,' but always rejected, largely because of the belief that Siam's economic development was dependent upon Chinese labor.

While conditions led the government to impose measures that were the logical consequence of Vajiravudh's writings, the royal pronouncements of the Seventh Reign were more akin to those of Chulalongkorn than to those of his successor. In a famous speech given in 1907 Chulalongkorn had said

It has always been my policy that the Chinese in Siam should have the same opportunities for labor and for profit as are possessed by my own countrymen. I regard them not as foreigners but as one of the component parts of the kingdom and sharing in its prosperity and advancement.

Prajadhipok, visiting Chinese schools in Bangkok in 1928, spoke to the same effect:

... the Siamese and Chinese have lived amicably together for generations. I do not wish for anything better than that they should continue to live thus harmoniously for all time. . . . In your schools, you teach your students to love their motherland, that is, China; that is natural and quite right. But apart from teaching them to love China, I trust that you will also teach them to love Siam; for you who live in this country have received good treatment from the Government, and are given rights equal to the Siamese themselves.

(Speeches of King Chulalongkorn, 1874 to 1910), Bangkok, 1967, p. 211; Gist of a Number of Speeches Delivered by the King on His Majesty 'a Visits to the Chineae Schools in Bangkok in B.E. 2470 (Bangkok, 1928), pp. 2-3; texts in Thai, Chinese, and English.)


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